A critical evaluation of the impact of globalisation on immigration and migration

The inseparability between politics and religion means that when analysing the link between globalisation, immigration and migration, there is an innate religious dimension. This is the analytical scope that will be undertaken and the rise of Islamophobia and populism is at the core of this scope. Both are inextricably linked to religion and are a result of globalisation which inevitably involves immigration and migration. This is the critical evaluation that will be undertaken, analysing how globalisation and immigration has contributed to the rise of Islamophobia and European populism.

Globalisation “is the name given to represent process of integration between states / markets / peoples at the global level of analysis”.[1] Globalisation reflects the ever-growing global interconnectedness, the merging of politics, economies and identities. Some see globalisation as a relatively recent phenomenon, but this is not the case. In fact, the origins of globalisation traces back to over two thousand years to Xi’an, where the Silk Road began.[2] The Silk Road enabled the beginning of frequent international trade between Asia and Europe.[3] This was the first of five distinct periods of globalisation which Vernham identifies.[4]Vernham argues that during these five periods, the function and nature of globalisation has distinctively changed. Previously the function of trade and low-level immigration, the world now finds itself in the period of global digital age, which includes immigration[5]. It’s cultural, religious, economic, political and social significance is all too clear to see. Cultures, especially in the Western World are essentially unrecognisable in comparison to cultures in previous centuries and millenniums. Globalisation is now inseparable from society, for example it is a core component of liberal economics as globalisation promotes opportunities of economic mobility and opportunity.[6] To a large extent, this has fundamentally changed the concept of the nation state. This was picked up upon by Huntington as he states that globalisation has caused a shift in conflict away from the economic and ideological towards the cultural.[7] For Huntington, this cultural conflict will dominate global politics, something which he referred to as “the clash of civilisations”.[8] It is clear that this ‘cultural clash’ naturally incorporates religion, as religion is a by-product of culture. Therefore, Huntington’s work can be used to explain why there is conflict between traditional European intellect and Islam, due to different cultures having different levels of cultural heterogeneity. This enables the link between globalisation, Islamophobia and cultural populism to be made.

The colossal economic impact of World War Two was somewhat of a turning point. As Murray states, Western European countries began the mass movement of people into its countries, due to labour shortages caused by the war.[9] This led to Europe becoming ‘hooked’ on immigration and it was practically impossible to the flow of people.[10] Therefore, Europe has gradually become a home for the entire world.[11] High levels of multiculturalism certainly reflects this shift. Immigration into Europe is certainly not slowing up either. The increasing imbalance in international food security and economics is a big factor in the increase of immigration and migration. For example, the United Nations found that 820 million people in the world still go hungry today.[12] However, this is not the only reason for global immigration, and as Castelli highlights, there are many different factors which can be categorised into: political, environmental, economic, social and demographic.[13] Mass migration is increasing, for example we are experiencing the ongoing migrant and refugee crisis from the Middle East. The heart-breaking image of the tiny boy who passed away on a Greek beach after crossing the Mediterranean illustrates the extent and severity of this existential humanitarian crisis.

Social, religious and political life in many cases are changing at unprecedented levels. Countries have become increasingly similar, certainly in the Western World. Economic unions, deterritorialization, multiculturalism and high levels of secularism illustrate this profound change. All of these processes are inextricably linked to globalisation and this has resulted in the decline of the imperativeness of the nation state. Chancellor Kohl of Germany identified this when he stated “the nation state cannot solve the problems of the twenty-first century”.[14] However, Kohl was certainly a European Unionist, as he claimed that the disintegration of the nation states of Europe into one union politically and economically was essential.[15]

However, Kohl’s stance is by no means reflected by all Europeans. Support for Eurosceptic populist parties in Europe has nearly doubled to 24% in the last ten years.[16] For Eurosceptics, national and cultural identity is eroding and one cannot underestimate the rising level of Euroscepticism, which forms and permeates through many different social and cultural ideals. Some forms are crystal clear, such as the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, other forms are not so clear. This is because there is not one fixed Eurosceptic ideology, due to Euroscepticism being found across the political spectrum. As Conti and Memoli highlight, Euroscepticism on the left tends to be economically orientated and Euroscepticism on the right tends to be culturally orientated.[17] Therefore, as Targett states, Euroscepticism is somewhat of an umbrella term.[18]

Stereotypically, Euroscepticism is perceived as being mainly anti-immigration. Following up on Conti and Memoli’s work, this tends not to be the case on the ‘left’. Rhetoric regarding immigration is often found on the right, but this does not mean that right-wing Eurosceptics are completely against immigration. but tend to take more of an anti-mass immigration stance. Yet it is worth emphasising that right-wing populist Euroscepticism is not just focused on mass immigration either, but dissatisfaction at the wider globalisation paradigm, for a whole abundance of reasons. Firstly, De Koster argues that some forms of Euroscepticism focuses on opposition to inequality, such as economic egalitarianism.[19] This form of Euroscepticism permeates into cultural Euroscepticism which Marks and Wilson identified, claiming that the economic project of the European Union has undermined the sovereignty of the states.[20] As March describes, it is the ‘common man’ against the ‘neo-liberal’ policies and institutions.[21] This use of rhetoric is often adopted by populists, the narrative of ‘us vs them’ and it is simplistic yet highly affective.

Another reason for Euroscepticism is the dissatisfaction of the perceived bureaucracy of the European Union, which is undoubtedly a project of globalisation. As Hix states, “Up until the last decade of the twentieth century, there was a permissive consensus towards the European project.[22] This came to an end in the nineties with the Danish and French referendums on the Maastricht Treaty and the sudden emergence of anti-European parties in 1994 … the public had woken up to the new reality: that a ‘political union’ of sorts had been created by their political leaders without this being clearly mandated or being noticed much by voters”.[23] This was also noticed by Köppel, who identified comparisons between the shift towards populist politics and the reformation of the Church. “The global Vatican misused its money and power.[24] This is similar to now; global politics has changed over the last ten to fifteen years and people have not been asked if they are happy with this direction or not.”[25]

There are many other reasons for populist Eurosceptic support, such as the Eurozone crisis and the consequent austerity packages that followed.[26] Yet populist concerns about economic inequality and mass immigration are becoming increasingly linked. Whilst Conti and Memoli were accurate in distinguishing fundamental differences between left and right-wing populism, populism in its contemporary form appears to be merging. This is because, the refugee crisis and the sheer volume of cross-border movement sparked domestic debates about immigration, social and religious cohesion, crime and terrorism.[27] Moreover, there continues to be high levels of immigration from Eastern European countries too. This combination added with the public spending cuts has led to greater competition for low-skilled jobs and greater competition for declining public services. Together, these factors have produced growing support for populist parties across the political spectrum such as the Alternative fur Deutschland and The Left Party. The combination of anti-EU rhetoric with anti-austerity, anti-mass immigration and anti-establishment has produced a powerful form of Eurosceptic populism and this is down to the failures of globalisation.[28]

The link between the rise of globalisation, populist narrative and Islamophobia is clear. In fact, the failures of globalisation have led to the globalisation of Islamophobia. Islam and its followers are becoming increasingly under attack, both directly and non-directly. There are abundances of examples which illustrates this; ‘Trumpism’, Indian Hindu nationalism, the Rohingya genocide, Islamophobia in Europe and much more. Institutionalised Islamophobia is on the rise too. Trump’s ‘travel ban’ is the perfect example.[29] Moreover, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Britain introduced the ‘Prevent’ scheme, which aimed to restrict civil liberties as part of its war on terror.[30] Kudnani argues that this scheme marginalises and labels Muslim communities.[31] This is potentially another example of institutionalised Islamophobia, which is what the Runnymeade Trust claim and thus reflects a post 9/11 change in attitudes towards the Muslim community.[32]

Islamophobia is currently at the centre of British politics too, highlighted by Baroness Warsi calling for an independent enquiry into ‘Tory Islamophobia’.[33] Hope Not Hate discovered that nearly two-thirds of Tory activists believe the religion is "a threat to western civilisation".[34] The Conservative Party were criticised even more when Boris Johnson referred to Muslim women as looking like ‘bank robbers’ and ‘letterboxes’.[35] Yet such is the frequency of politicised Islamophobia, cases of Islamophobia have been found on the left too. For example, Emily Thornberry stated she would not trust a woman wearing a burka to look after her children or mother.[36] Further evidence indicating Islamophobia across the British political spectrum and it is utterly deplorable.

Yet it is worth noting that a lot of British politicians have been working to tackle Islamophobia too. The all-party parliamentary group in 2018 defined Islamophobia as the “irrational hostility, fear and hatred of Islam, Muslims and Islamic culture, and active discrimination towards this group as individuals or collectively”.[37]The term is a relatively new phenomenon as it only entered the policy discourse around two decades ago, but Islamophobia itself has a much longer history. The history can be dated back to the period of colonialism and imperialism where the process of ‘othering’ took place. This enabled the West to portray Muslims as fundamentally different to ‘us’. Therefore, Islamophobia has been rooted in Western society for some time.

Presently, the Muslim community certainly face everyday challenges in the UK. For example, the Independent found that 31% believe that Islam poses a threat to the British way of life and only 32% believe that Islam and the British way of life are compatible.[38] The reasoning behind these attitudes are complex and intricate, but one must not underestimate the role that the far-right have played in forming and increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric. The far-right have used simple narrative to produce stereotypes that degrade and label the whole Muslim community. These stereotypes tend to be centred around: Muslims are inherently violent; they cannot be trusted; they want to spread Shari’a Law and a lot of them are sexual predators.[39] Moreover, the far-right use singular events such as the New Year’s Eve sex attacks in Cologne or the Manchester bombings. Narrative plays a big part in this, people like Tommy Robinson frequently refer to the ‘fight against Islam’[40]. When these events are blown out of proportion and added with hateful narrative, people become genuinely fearful of the ‘other’ and become opposed to cultural identity in order to protect the ‘virtuous’ people from the influences of the ‘outsiders’.[41] Therefore, ethnocentrism is at the heart of this form of Islamophobia.[42] This narrative illustrates the concept of othering and liquid fear, which is at the heart of the Islamophobic tendencies.

Furthermore, religion plays a big part in forming Islamophobic attitudes too. As the far-right are traditionally cultured orientated, a pro-Christian rhetoric is often possessed. For the far-right, the noticeable decline of cultural and political Christianity is a ‘theoretical justification’ for hostility towards Islam. They see globalisation, mass immigration and the rise of Islam in Europe as the reason for the decline of their cultural, religious and social ideals. Links between globalisation, immigration and religious conflict are very apparent. For example, Poland is rife with Islamophobia and direct links with the countries Catholic culture and heritage are clear. As Tarczynski (Polish MP) stated “it’s about preserving Christian culture, Christianity is our DNA, multiculturalism is not a value, we do not want the burqa in Poland”.[43] Many see secularism as a result of globalisation and immigration and as Bruce highlights, secularism leads to indifference which often results in conflict. Therefore, it can be argued that Islamophobia and the ‘defence’ of Christianity is a by-product of globalisation and mass immigration.

Post-World War Two globalisation has led to high levels of immigration and migration, resulting in multiculturalism. This for many is a great thing, the diversity and merging of cultures, religions and its people. However, an ever-increasing number of people disapprove of the changing demographic. The perceived loss of cultural and national identity has paved the way to hateful, racist and xenophobic attitudes to immigrants and their identities, thus contributing to toxic generalisations of the ‘other’. It is concludable that this is an unintended consequence of the wider globalisation paradigm, which naturally incorporates immigration and migration too.

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[1] Roy Smith, Imad El-Anis, and Christopher Farrands, International Political Economy in the 21st Century: Contemporary Issues and Analyses, 2nd edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 322.

[2] Peter Vanham, A brief history of globalization (2019) <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/how-globalization-4-0-fits-into-the-history-of-globalization/> [accessed 9 December 2019].

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Patrick Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (University of Virginia: Yale University Press, 2018), p. 156-157.

[7] Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72.3, (1993), 22-49 (p. 22). 

[8] Ibid.

[9] Douglas Murray, The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018), p. 2.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] United Nations, ' The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019.', Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations., 1.1, (2019), 1-239 (p. 3).

[13] Francesco Castelli, 'Drivers of migration: why do people move?', Journal of Travel Medicine, 25.1, (2018), 1-7 (p. 3).

[14] Douglas Murray, The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018), p. 6.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Simon Hix, Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe, ed. by Benjamin Martill, Uta Staiger (London: UCL Press, 2018), p. 75.

[17] Samira Von Bohemen, Willem De Koster and Jeroen Van Der Waal, ‘Euroscepticism among Dutch Leftist and Rightist Populist Constituencies: How can the U-Curve be Understood?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 57.2, (2019), 371-387 (p.371). 

[18] Ibid.

[19] Samira Von Bohemen, Willem De Koster and Jeroen Van Der Waal, ‘Euroscepticism among Dutch Leftist and Rightist Populist Constituencies: How can the U-Curve be Understood?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 57.2, (2019), 371-387 (p.373). 

[20] Ibid., p.374

[21] Ibid., p.371

[22] Simon Hix, Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe, ed. by Benjamin Martill, Uta Staiger (London: UCL Press, 2018), p. 74.

[23] Ibid.

[24] BBC News, Switzerland: The cradle of populism? (2018) < https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p06mf9v1 > [accessed 7 November 2019].

[25] Ibid.

[26] Simon Hix, Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe, ed. by Benjamin Martill, Uta Staiger (London: UCL Press, 2018), p. 74.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Vahid Niayesh, Statistics show that Trump’s “travel ban” was always a Muslim ban (2019) <https://qz.com/1736809/statistics-show-that-trumps-travel-ban-was-always-a-muslim-ban/> [accessed 16 December 2019].

[30] Barbara Cohen and Waqas Tufali, Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all (2017) < https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf> [accessed 13 December 2019].

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Dan Sabbagh , Sayeeda Warsi calls for inquiry into Islamophobia within Tory party (2018) <  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/04/sayeeda-warsi-calls-for-inquiry-into-islamophobia-within-tory-party> [accessed 13 December 2019].

[34] Nicholas Mairs, Most Tory members believe Islam is 'a threat to British way of life', poll finds (2019) <https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/105170/most-tory-members-believe-islam-threat> [accessed 16 December 2019].

[35] Boris Johnson, Denmark has got it wrong. Yes, the burka is oppressive and ridiculous – but that's still no reason to ban it (2018) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/05/denmark-has-got-wrong-yes-burka-oppressive-ridiculous-still/?subId1=xid:fr1576521329992jha> [accessed 16 December 2019].

[36] Lee Harpin, Emily Thornberry said she would not want her family 'looked after by someone wearing a burka' (2018) <https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/emily-thornberry-said-she-would-not-want-her-elderly-mum-looked-after-by-someone-wearing-a-burka-1.468119> [accessed 13 December 2019].

[37] All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, Report on the inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia / anti-Muslim hatred (2018) < https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf> [accessed 3 December 2019].

[38] Rosie Carter, New statistics confirm what we already knew – Islamophobia is thriving in all parts of British society (2017) <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/islamophobia-new-statistics-hope-but-hate-british-muslims-society-a9006516.html> [accessed 14 December 2019].

[39] Fiyaz Mughal, Muslim Identity in a Turbulent Age, ed. by Mike Hardy, Fiyaz Mughal and Sarah Markiewicz (London and Philadelphia : Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2017), p. 98-99.

[40] Dominic Casciani, Tommy Robinson: The rancour, rhetoric and riches of brand Tommy (2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48942411> [accessed 17 December 2019].

[41] Samira Von Bohemen, Willem De Koster and Jeroen Van Der Waal, ‘Euroscepticism among Dutch Leftist and Rightist Populist Constituencies: How can the U-Curve be Understood?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 57.2, (2019), 371-387 (p.375). 

[42] Ibid., p. 372

[43] Al Jazeera, Polish MP: 'For me, multiculturalism is not a value' (2019) < https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2019/11/polish-mp-multiculturalism-191108202121337.html> [accessed 12 November 2019].